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Abstract
Until now policy makers and researchers considered the problem of uncertainty and
verification to be of minor importance for the Kyoto process. However, the first studies
that recently appeared on uncertainty estimation of carbon accounting reveal that
uncertainties of the reported emissions on the country level are large. In an environment
of such large uncertainties, verification of emission reductions must be viewed as a
crucial mechanism to secure the very functioning of the Protocol.
There are at least four reasons why verification is important:
1. The political cost of no-verification is potentially very high. Under no-verification in
2012 we will have little trust in our knowledge of (a) What we did, and (b) Who did
what between 1990 and 2010?
2. The Kyoto Protocol requires verifiability for inter alia trade (Article 17), hence
overall country emissions must be verifiable; and
3. Non-verifiable emission reduction claims could lead to misconduct, putting the
entire market process in danger. The reasons for this are:
 Asymmetric gains from biased reporting could lead to market disintegration;
 Kyoto provides perverse incentives to preserve and enlarge the “shadow carbon
economy”; and
 Uncertainty of supply of emission reductions leads to less predictable market
conditions and economic efficiency losses.
4. Scientific proof of the true environmental benefits of the Protocol is at least delayed.
Since the issue of uncertainty has been ignored for a long time, the institutional basis for
verification is still very weak. Currently, the institutional set-up is such that we face a
situation where:
• there are no rules and instruments to secure verifiable emission reduction claims;
and
• a sufficiently strong and independent body to police uncertainties is not installed.
In this paper, we provide a set of tools to strategically deal with the problem of
uncertainty and verification under the Kyoto Protocol. We do this by:
• providing an overview of the instruments to deal with verification (no-, trend-, level-
and top-down/bottom-up verification under PCA and FCA);
• compute costs scenarios for those instruments under various flexibility scenarios;
and
• providing a short discussion on practical steps and crucial decisions to be made that
lead to a more verifiable Protocol.
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Concern
Will Kyoto be Unverifiable?
There has been quite a lot of discussion on uncertainty in general, but very little
discussion and work has been performed on the uncertainty of the “hard facts” —
emissions to the atmosphere.1 Only recently, have national assessments of uncertainty of
GHG emissions become available (Rypdal and Zhang, 2000; Nilsson et al., 2000;
Eggleston et al., 1998). Nilsson et al. (2000) concluded that given the uncertainties (of
GHG emission inventories) in place, most of the so-called Annex I countries of the
Kyoto Protocol will not be able to verify their Kyoto target emissions at the country
level. This is due to the fact that the reductions of emissions are small during the
commitment period and the uncertainties of the net emissions are large. It follows that
without appropriate verification provisions, Annex I countries cannot prove that Kyoto
actions improved the atmospheric balance to the extent claimed. Despite the great
importance of stable expectations within the Kyoto market, it is the uncertainty related
to the “hard facts” that will ultimately determine the success and satisfaction with the
Protocol.
Political Costs are Potentially High
There is a danger that policy makers are on the way to making the decision that
uncertainty of the true environmental benefits of the Protocol is not important.
Verification is not mentioned in the agenda of COP 6 and will, thus, not be thoroughly
discussed during this particular conference. However, there might be a significant
political cost associated to the decision of no-verification. The sum of Annex I
countries, irrespective of CDMs, will physically not be able to verify their joint
reduction claim. This might endanger the credibility of Annex I countries in the climate
negotiation process and carries the potential to decrease the political momentum of
climate actions in the international arena on accession. In addition, it will be impossible
                                               
1
 Victor (1991) identified very early the problem of uncertainty by writing “...it is instructive to separate
the ends and means of pollution control. The ends may be agreed upon even in the face of great
uncertainty, but in designing the mechanism for achieving those ends uncertainty and complexity can
prove to be extreme obstacles. This is especially true when highly quantified strategies such as markets
are employed.”
2to judge how far the countries’ true emission reductions deviate from the reduction
claims, which will negatively impact the political chemistry among participating
countries and might consequently hamper ambitious future actions.
It must be clearly understood that the Kyoto Protocol is on the management of a global
common resource. Monitoring the contributions and use of this resource is, to our mind,
a very fundamental precondition for the functioning of any rules governing the
management of the resource.
The Text of the Kyoto Protocol Contains
Inconsistencies with respect to Verification
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol already foresees problems relating to uncertainty by
stating “The Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles, modalities,
rules and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting and accountability for
emissions trading”. Similar concerns on the verifiability of Kyoto actions are stated for
the other flexibilities (JI, CDM) and sink activities in the Protocol. Most interesting,
however, is that verification is not mentioned in the formulation of the overall Kyoto
target in Article 3.1. At least for reasons of consistency verification should be
mentioned in the formulation of the overall targets. Trading of emission reductions can
only be verifiable if countries’ overall carbon accounts are verifiable. In this respect, the
text of the Protocol misses a hierarchical logic, because verifiable amounts for emission
trading must per definition be based on verifiable national accounting.
Lack of Verifiability Leaves Room for Misconduct
The uncertainty of whether a claim of a ton of emission reduction is really 1000kg or
only 750kg has important implications for carbon trading. There is a danger that large
uncertainties of national GHG accounts2 invite false reporting of emission reduction
figures triggering an inflation of emission reduction claims. Mechanisms of misconduct
can range from preserving or expanding unreported (unmonitored) segments of the
GHG economy of mostly fossil fuels and biomass burning all the way to ignoring
leakages from biological sinks. Massive misconduct could finally lead to a
disintegration of the market or at least to major frustration with the process due to
asymmetric gains from intentional biased reporting. In addition, there is a danger that
due to the lack of verification Kyoto provides additional incentives to push more of the
                                               
2
 Thorough national studies evaluating uncertainties were conducted for only a few countries like the UK,
Norway and Russia. Norway shows a trend uncertainty for CO2 of ±5%. Norway’s level of uncertainty of
all GHGs was estimated to be ±21% in 1990 and ±17% in 2010. Levels of uncertainty of Australia’s
GHG emissions data vary from 10% for CO2 emissions of the energy sector (10% actually being the
lowest margin) to 100% and more for methane emissions for some sectors (Jepma, 2000). Also, an
extensive 1999 review of the UK’s second national communication states in a final note: “ ‘The results
obtained indicated that while the uncertainty of the annual emissions on a CO2 equivalent basis was
estimated at ±18.5 per cent, the uncertainty of the emission trend for 1990–2010 was estimated at a 4 per
cent with a confident of 95 per cent.’  And a final example: our own back-of-the-envelope calculation
based on the 1996 review of the Netherlands’ national communication led us to conclude that an overall
12.5% error margin could then not be ruled out; this margin has now come down to about 5%.”
However, all of these studies did not assess biases and were not assessed in an all-encompassing FGA
framework.
3(carbon) economy into the unobserved sector through increased black market premiums.
It is, thus, paramount to implement an appropriate verification mechanism for the
mutual recognition of emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol.
Uncertainty Creates Unstable Expectations
and Economic Efficiency Losses
Stable expectations are produced only when actions by other market participants
become predictable (i.e. no room for misconduct). A complete set of coherent existing
rules, long term and credible strategies and targets, and verifiable outputs are the key
ingredients for stable expectations for market participants. A lack of stable expectations
and a lack of credibility in the process per se produces an environment where market
participants will look for short term fixes rather than true commitments for long-term
structural and technological change. Uncertainty on the supply side of emission
reductions that are going to be available for trading lead necessarily to increased
coordination costs and unstable and wrong expectations.
Uncertainty creates efficiency losses with respect to the ultimate goal of decreasing
emissions to the atmosphere. This is due to the fact that without a crisp knowledge of
the effectiveness of a Kyoto measure resources are likely to be allocated in an
inefficient way. Without a verification tool at hand it is impossible to compare Kyoto
actions with respect to their environmental benefits.
Goal
What Counts is What the Atmosphere Sees
The climate is changing. Human and natural emissions of GHGs are the major cause.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change states “The ultimate
objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of
the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. The
Kyoto process was initiated to set specific targets for emissions of GHGs from
industrialized countries, together with an array of flexibilities for implementation. Thus,
the central issue is the verification of the true environmental benefits as indicated in the
above statement by the UNFCC. It would not appear sensible to start an ambitious
international process without verifying the very achievements of this process. The aim
of the process must thus be that anthropogenic climate actions become verifiable with
respect to the emission reductions to the atmosphere.
The lack of a verification tool makes it impossible to assess the effectiveness of
emission reduction or sink activities with respect to the ultimate goal of improving the
atmospheric balance. Thus, for making Kyoto operational a verification tool is
instrumental.
4How to go about Verification
Instruments for Verification
The present verification provisions and the currently installed institutions needed for
meaningful verification are by far not sufficient to guarantee compliance with the
Protocol’s requirements on verification. Furthermore, the Protocol is silent on the mode
of verification.
Currently, the scientific and technological basis is too weak to measure the factual
environmental benefits to the atmosphere. There is still a long way to go for scientific
proof of the environmental benefits from Kyoto actions.  Among other things the
accuracy and precision of measurements must significantly be improved (MPI, 1999). It
is up to the policy makers to define the path in order to reach the ultimate goal of fully
verifiable climate actions, where top-down measurements agree with bottom-up
approaches to estimate emissions.
Table 1 gives an overview of the currently available instruments that will help to make
Kyoto and post-Kyoto actions verifiable with respect to its contribution to an improved
atmospheric balance.
Table 1: Overview of instruments for verification of Kyoto actions
PGA FGA
No verification We do not know what we did
and
Do not know who did what
We do not know what we did
and
Do not know who did what
Trend verification Verify the rate of emission
reduction, but biases are still
likely
Verify the rate of emission
reduction and biases are
minimized as must as possible
Level verification Verify that 2010 emissions are
different from 1990 emissions
by some amount,
Biases are still likely
Verify that 2010 emissions are
different from 1990 emissions
by some amount,
Biases are minimized as much
as possible
Top-down/bottom-
up verification
Verify fluxes from the fossil
fuel system
Verify all fluxes
5As shown in Figure 1 there are three types of verification: (1) No verification (2) Trend
verification3 and (3) Level verification.4 The goal of level verification is to verify that
the emission levels in 2010 are different from those in 1990, whereas trend verification
concerns the verifiability of the rate of emission reduction. Verification is intimately
linked to the apparent uncertainty. Assessments of uncertainty of projects or of emission
reduction claims on the country level can be made within Partial Greenhouse Gas
Accounting (PGA) or Full Greenhouse Gas Accounting (FGA).5
The most straightforward way to make sure that a country or project complies is by
undershooting. In the case of trend verification, with some probability limit the reported
emission reduction rate is not allowed to be greater than the target rate (see the
probability functions in Figure 1). Another way to look at the problem is that we require
reducing a country’s emission reduction claim by some uncertainty factor.
From Table 1 it follows that there is a wide range of different qualities of verification.
Policy makers will have to decide what kind of verification is necessary to keep the
process in full swing. In summary policy makers have to decide on three things:
1. What type of verification is needed (No-, Trend-, Level- Top-down/bottom-up
verification).
2. +RZDUHWKHXQFHUWDLQWLHVDVVHVVHG XQGHU3*$RU)*$.
3. Empirical confidence interval of the statement.
The specific provisions on these three items with respect to verification should be
defined in Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol.
Implications of Level and Trend Uncertainty
Based on our empirical research we can conclude that (see graphical representation of
the problem in Figure 1),
“Even if Parties claim compliance with their Kyoto targets, most Parties will be unable
to verify that their 2010 emissions are different from their 1990 emissions. However,
compliance with the target, if interpreted as a certain average net emission reduction
rate, can still be made verifiable”.
                                               
3
 Trend verification for a 5% reduction target requires in probabilistic terms for a 95% confidence
interval: 95.0)95.0
X
XX1(P
1990
19902010 ≥=−− .
4
 Level verification for a 5% reduction target requires in probabilistic terms for a 95% confidence
interval: 95.0)X95.0X(P 20101990 ≥= .
5
 An example of a partial carbon account would look at a Kyoto forest’s above ground biomass. Whereas
a FCA would look into below and above ground biomass. A FCA on a sufficiently large spatial scale
would help to even detect leakage from the FCA-ed Kyoto forest. A comparison of a global FGA with
global atmospheric measurements would be the ultimate check for biases in FGAs. It follows that there is
a continuous scale of quality in the measurement of uncertainties along different accounting systems.
6Figure 1: Illustration of level uncertainties and trend verification for a hypothetical case
of Country A.
Level Verification: The level uncertainty of 1990 is so large that the 5%
emission reduction disappears within the initial band of uncertainty of the
1990 emission level.
Trend Verification: An average rate of 7% emission reduction between 1990
and 2010 would make sure that the following statement holds: Country A
achieved at least an average rate of 5% reduction of its emissions with 95%
confidence (symbolized by the shifted probability function). Whereas a claim
of a 5% emission reduction rate cannot exclude a 3% reduction rate with 95%
confidence.
The empirical fact on level verification demand
a 2nd Precautionary Principle
The first part of the statement above refers to the empirical fact that the Parties’
emission reduction targets are still within the total uncertainty bands. It follows that
policy makers will have to adopt, what we call The 2nd Precautionary Principle (2nd
PP). This principle must assert that the responsibility connected to the non-verifiability
of the Kyoto targets per se rests with the policy makers. Policy makers, thus, have to
take on the risk that we will have to say in 2010 ‘We do not know what we were doing
differently after 1990’. Clearly, this type of risk sharing based on The 2nd
Precautionary Principle is a necessary precondition to make the Kyoto Protocol
operational on the project level.
7%
5%
3%
Uncertainty of the average
rate of emission reduction
Uncertainty range of the 1990 emission level
time
Net
emis-
sion
1990 2010
7Under current conditions trend verification seems to be the
most operable mechanism to tackle the uncertainty problem
The second part of the statement refers to verification of compliance in the sense that
the target is defined as an average emission reduction rate. In such a situation trend
uncertainty is the appropriate uncertainty concept and refers to the change in activities
and in emission factors. Trend uncertainty takes into account temporal correlation
between uncertainty factors and is thus smaller than level. Note, however, that trend
verification does not imply level verification as illustrated in Figure 1. This means that
trend verification can only be informative with respect to the emission reduction rate.
Following the wording of Article 3.1 suggests that trend verification seems to be the
most consistent verification type with the current Protocol.6
Estimating the Economic Costs of a Verification Clause under Kyoto
IIASA calculations of the Kyoto market using the CERT model (Kappel and Staub,
2000),7 which is based on the MIT-EPPA cost functions for CO2 emission reductions of
fossil fuels, and requiring verification indicate that depending on the probability limit
and the definition of uncertainty total emission reduction costs will at least increase
fivefold, if uncertainties cannot be reduced significantly (see Figure 2). If, however, the
total sink (hereafter called Green hot air [GHA])8 strength is accepted as a direct offset
from fossil fuel emissions then verification seems to become cost-neutral. In this case
the type of verification is assumed to be trend verification. If we allow full flexibility in
the trading mechanism, the world market price is projected to be in the range or lower
than the prices predicted under a fossil fuel dominated Kyoto Protocol without
verification provisions (uncertainty equals zero). Under such market rules about the
same quantity of fossil fuels would be reduced since green hot air comes at almost no
costs and in this way ‘pays’ for the verification of both emission reductions and sinks.
Thus, the probability that we provide in total more environmental benefits under the
same costs is higher compared to the unverifiable fossil fuel dominated market. Also the
                                               
6
 Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol calls for trend verification by “...with a view to reducing their [Annex I
countries] overall emissions of such gases [listed in Annex B] by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in
the commitment period 2008 and 2012. Article 24 second paragraph further specifies “For the purpose of
this Article, ‘the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I’ means that
the amount communicated on or before the date of adoptions of this Protocol by the Parties included in
Annex I in their first national communication submitted in accordance with Article 12 of the
Convention”. In other words trend verification will have to be used to verify the emission reduction as
already fixed in Annex B. The Kyoto Protocol in its current form does not require a verification of
verifiable differences in the levels of GHG emissions.
7
 Applying the cost functions of the POLES model the same qualitative results occur (Godal, 2000).
8
 The definition of sinks here refers to the IPCC definition of sinks and should not be confused with total
biosphere. When humans alter the biosphere through changes in land use and forestry management
practices, they can create a carbon uptake that is an ongoing result of land-use changes in previous
decades. Here we follow the logic that carbon uptake from improved land use change and forestry
management practices should be regarded as a direct offset of current fossil fuel emissions. In the US the
LUC and forestry sink was estimated to be about 24% in 1990 and about 12% in 1998. If we assume that
the trend uncertainty of fossil fuels of the US is equal to that of Norway (±5%) and the trend uncertainty
of the sinks three times larger (±15%) [there is no study yet on the trend uncertainty of sinks, but level
uncertainties were assessed for Russia in Nilsson et al. (2000)] then the total uncertainty of the combined
system is ± 6.1 %.
8incentives to innovate would still prevail under such market rules.9 Due to large
uncertainties on the total sink strength in 2010 the range of possible world market prices
for carbon is potentially large.
Market rules allowing for GHA with, however, less flexibility are likely to come at a
higher economic cost than a fossil fuel centered Kyoto Protocol without verification
clauses. Under such non-flexibility the cost would at maximum be about threefold if
uncertainties cannot be reduced given reasonable assumptions on uncertainty levels and
given trend verification.
A Kyoto market that includes GHA and does not require verification will with a rather
high probability lead to a situation of oversupply of carbon credits. Who should then
pay the Annex I countries for their over-fulfillment?
FFnHA: Fossil fuels and no Hot Air.
FFHA: Fossil fuels and Hot Air.
GHA2010nHA: Green Hot Air projected to 2010 + Fossil fuels and no Hot Air.
GHA2010HA: Green Hot Air projected to 2010 + Fossil fuels and Hot Air.
GHA1990nHA: Green Hot Air estimates for 1990 + Fossil fuels and no Hot Air.
GHA1990HA: Green Hot Air estimates for 1990 + Fossil fuels and Hot Air.
Assumptions on GHA can be found in Table 2 in Appendix I.
Figure 2: World market price and levels of trend uncertainty that is penalized under
various market rules. In the absence of data it was assumed that trend
uncertainties were distributed uniformly among countries.
                                               
9
 Experience with innovation systems and environmental performance show that innovation occurs only if
long-term goals are clearly and credibly set, which are coupled with consistent current actions of both
carrots and sticks. Long-term goals were not yet discussed in a meaningful manner in the Kyoto process.
The currently discussed supplementarity restrictions are probably too short-term in their nature and more
so are less credible given the actual emission path of many Annex I countries after 1990 and the involved
political and economic costs.
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9Problems with Green Hot Air (GHA)
Disregarding the political dispute on including biospheric measures in the Kyoto
Protocol the major obstacles of including GHA and a verification clause into the Kyoto
Protocol are:
• Emission reduction — sink ratio can vary substantially across countries.10
• A true Full Carbon Account was only performed for Russia. Very few countries
assessed uncertainties of fossil fuel emissions with very little knowledge on
uncertainties of biospheric measures. No country assessed biases.
• Costs and mode of uncertainty reduction are unknown.11
• There are a number of physical parameters to be considered (see Jonas et al., 2000).
Separate Accounting from Activities
Uncertainties in GHG accounting are made up of essentially two components. Random
errors and biases, where biased reporting can be used for intentional cheating. It is
reasonable to assume that the probability of biases decreases with the
comprehensiveness of the system analyzed, because we can make consistency checks. It
is, thus, indispensable to always monitor the entire GHG system (Full GHG Accounting
[FGA]) irrespective of what kind of actions are credited for in the Kyoto mechanism. A
FGA should always be the compulsory monitoring system, whereas actions that are the
means to get to the target and are subject to the Kyoto market rules have to be
accounted for as (a) consistent subsystem(s) (Partial GHG Account [PGA]) within a
FGA. Verification should make sure that the acknowledged credit influenced the
atmospheric GHG balance in the intended (claimed) fashion. FGA provides the
necessary accounting framework and carries the possibility of top-down verification
under certain conditions (all countries participate and reporting is unbiased).
Capacity Building for Verification
A strong, functioning and credible monitoring agency has yet to be established. Such an
agency should be responsible for the assessment of verifiable emissions. The status of
independence and the right to conduct verification missions seems to be of great
importance. However, some sovereign states will probably refuse inspections on their
territory. Joint action on uncertainty and emission estimates would make economic
sense. Monitoring costs will probably decrease with increasing scale when countries
join forces to decrease uncertainties.
                                               
10
 One would expect that countries will have to renegotiate their targets under such a regime [Jacoby et al.
(2000) note that the established targets do not follow any rational rule based on country characteristics
(e.g., per capita levels). Baer et al. (2000) state that adoption of the principle of equal per capita emissions
rights could help resolve the objections of both developed and developing countries and ease the path for
the community of nations to implement the Kyoto Protocol. Obersteiner et al. (2000b) argue that a more
practical approach would be to try to form Common Carbon Markets, which would reduce the winner-
loser gap compared to the one and only global carbon market].
11
 Kyoto including GHA and demanding verification could turn out to be very cheap if the costs of
uncertainty reduction are very small [which they probably initially are (see, e.g., the cost proxy for
biosphere uncertainty reduction (Obersteiner et al., 2000a))].
10
The other way to assess uncertainties would be that individual countries report
uncertainties and take measures themselves to lower uncertainties under the supervision
of the international agency, which would play more the role of a facilitator rather than a
watch dog. Under such a scheme credibility would not be fully established. Remaining
white spots on the uncertainty landscape should then be assessed, given the best
available knowledge employing some rough rule of thumb estimates.  Countries that
abstain from full scrutiny of their reports will have to live with the verification penalty
for the uncertainties that were assessed.
Conclusions
Verification of emission reductions on both the national accounts and project levels is a
necessary precondition for the functioning of the Protocol as such and the international
carbon market in particular. Verification should apply equally to both fossil fuel and
biospheric actions. Uncertainties are so high that without the implementation of a
credible verification mechanism other instruments than market instruments must be
applied to solve the problem of GHG reduction on an international scale.
Uncertainties are so large that a 2nd Precautionary Principle should be adopted stating
that the policy makers carry the responsibilities associated with the problem that in 2012
we will not be able to show that the average 2010 emission levels are different from
1990 levels.
Policy makers should decide on the mode and quality of verification, as outlined in this
report, in the very near future to get the process of verification going in a timely
manner. The mode and quality of verification will have to meet political, economic and
scientific criteria.
Our simulation results give qualitative indication that verification could be implemented
in a cost-neutral manner if a broad sink definition would be accepted. Under such
market rules and given the same percentage net emission reduction target, the emission
reduction of the fossil fuel sub-system of the verifiable combined fossil fuel and sink
system would approximately be the same as those of the purely fossil fuel concentrated
market without a verification mechanism. This is due to the fact that sinks would
‘subsidize’ verification of both the energy and sink accounts. 
With respect to stable market conditions, verification should mainly be about the
elimination of biased reporting. Only within a Full Greenhouse Gas Accounting system
can partial accounts be cross-checked for consistency. Such a full accounting system
has yet to be built for all Annex I countries. IIASA has established Full Carbon
Accounts for Russia and Austria.
Verification, as described in this report, will require strong and credible institutional
structures, which are currently lacking.
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Appendix I
Table 2: GHA: Estimated sink strength (IPCC sink definition) in MMTCE according to
National Communications (except Canada) for 1990 and ‘best’ sensible guesses for
2010.
1990 2010
USA 316 350
JPN 24 30
EEC 66 80
OOC -52.4 207.6
Australia -86 19
Canada 0 150
New Zealand 20 25
Norway 13.6 13.6
EET 57.5 76
Bulgaria 7 10
Czech Republic 3 5
Hungary 2 3
Poland 35 45
Slovakia 4 5
Romania 6.5 8
Ex-Yugoslavia - -
FSU 209.5 390.5
Russia 150 280
Ukraine 51 75
Estonia 1.5 1.5
Latvia 4 5
Lithuania 3 4
Belorussia - 25
Other FSU - -
TOTAL 620.6 1134.1
